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CORPORATIONS
RIGHT OF STOCKHOLDERS TO INSPECT CORPORATE RECORDS
The plaintiff, Flowers, was the owner of more than one-fourth
of the stock of the defendant corporation, The Rotary Printing
Company. By a series of letters passing between the plaintiff, and
the officers of the corporation, requests to examine the minutes, books
and records of the corporation were made and refused. A manda-
tory injunction was sought to compel the corporation to permit the
plaintiff to inspect the books and records of the defendant. The
Common Pleas Court of Huron County found that the plaintiff was
entitled, under the statute, to a penalty of $4,950.oo.1 Acting within
the broad discretion permitted by the statute, the trial court remitted
all but $950.00 on the condition that the plaintiff be allowed to
examine the corporate records. On appeal the corporation contended
that the refusal of the demand of a stockholder for permission to
examine the books and records of a corporation is not one of the
things for which the penal provision of Section 8623-1272 may be
invoked. The Court of Appeals held that "subdivision (e) of Section
8623-127, General Code, which provides that a 'failure to do any act
required by this act to be done, shall be subject to a penalty,' relates
not only to the enumerated acts and duties enjoined upon corpora-
tions in that particular section, but relates to the whole General
Corporation Act, and a failure by a corporation to allow inspection
of its books and records by a shareholder as provided in Section
8623-63, 3 General Code, subjects the corporation to the penalty pro-
vided by Section 8623-127, General Code." 4
' Under Sec. 8623-127.
20Ho G. C. §8623-127 provides: "Every corporation which shall neglect, fail or
refuse (a) to keep and maintain or cause to be kept and maintained the books of account
required by this act to be kept and maintained, or (b) to keep minutes of the proceedings
of its incorporators, shareholders and directors, or (c) to prepare or cause to be prepared
and cause to be certified the statement of profit and loss and balance sheet required to be
prepared, or (d) fail, within three days after request, to mail such statement of profit and
loss and balance sheet to any shareholder making request, or (e) to do any act required
by this act to be done, shall be subject to a penalty of one hundred dollars ($100) and
the further penalty of ten dollars ($10) for every day, beginning three days after written
request, that such default shall continue, to be paid to each shareholder making such
request, and the right of each shareholder to enforce payment of such penalty shall be
in addition to all other remedies. The court in which any action is brought to enforce
such penalty may reduce, remit or suspend such penalty on such terms and conditions
as it may deem reasonable when it is made to appear that the neglect, failure or refusal
was excusable or that the imposition of the penalty would be unreasonable or unjust."
3 OHio G. C. §8623-63 provides: "Every corporation shall keep and maintain adequate
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Universal recognition has been given to the right of the stock-
holder to inspect the books and records of the corporation in which
he has made an investment., "The real owners of all the net assets
of any corporation are the stockholders." 6 A stockholder is entitled
to reliable information as to the condition and manner of conducting
the firm's business, 7 to see whether the capital of which he has con-
tributed a share is being prudently and profitably employed.8 Those
in charge of its affairs are the agents and trustees employed to care
for and manage the property of the corporation and conduct its
operations.
In the United States lO the common law view adopted did not
confer an absolute or unqualified right of inspection in favor of the
stockholder. The privilege must be exercised for a purpose ger-
mane to the stockholder's interests or for advancing the interests of
the corporation."'
"The right of inspection, either generally or with respect to
certain specific books and records, is expressly given by the consti-
tution in a few states.1 2 In most of the states it is the subject of
statutory enactment and the statutes of the various states differ ma-
and correct accounts of its business transactions, including accounts of its assets, liabilities,
receipts, disbursements, gains, losses, stated capital and shares, together with such par-
ticular accounts as are required by this act.
"The books of account, lists of shareholders, and their addresses, records of the
i.suance and transfer of shares, voting trust agreements, if any are filed, and the minutes
of meetings of every corporation shall be open to the inspection of every shareholder at
all reasonable times save and exc ept for unreasonable or improper purposes."
'Flowers v. The Rotary Printing Co., 65 Ohio App. 543, 19 Ohio Op. 249, 31 N. E.
(2d) 251, 1940. Motion to ccrtify overruled, October 2, 1940.
S5 FLFTCHrR, CosroRATIO S (1931) §§2213-2215; 13 As. JUR., "Corporations," §§432-
449.
" See The William Coale Development Co. v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St. 582, 585, 170
N. E. 582 (1930).
7Annotation (1923) 22 A. L. R. 24.
8 Otis-Hidden Co., ot al v. Scheirich, 187 Ky. 423, 219 S. W. 191, 22 A. L. R. 19, 22
(1920).
0 Ibid; The William Coals Development Co. v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St., 582, 170 N. E.
52 (1930), cited spra note 6; State of Wisconsin ex rel. B. A. Dempsey v. verra
Aluminum Foundry Co., 173 Wis. 651, 182 N. W. 354, 22 A. L. R. 5 (1921); Foster v.
White, 86 Ala. 467, 6 So. 88 (1888).
"' "According to the English doctrine, a stockholder, in the absence of a statute con-
ferring the right, has no right of inspection of the corporate books for the purpose of
acquiring knowledge of facts upon which to create a dispute; but there must be a defined
and distinct dispute already in existence with reference to which the right of inspection
is demanded." See note 8 s.pra.
l a See note 5 supra; Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148 (1905); Annotations (1926)
43 A. L. R. 783, (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1373.
" CutXr. CoasT. Art. XII, §14; LoUISANA CONST., 1898, Art. CCVL, §273.
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terially in their terms and with respect to rights conferred." 13 Courts
are not in accord as to the nature of the right to inspect the books
of a corporation conferred by the statutory or constitutional pro-
vision. In some ,jurisdictions it is said that the right where there
are no express limitations is an absolute and arbitrary one, that the
-court aids in its exercise without reference or regard to the motive
of the stockholder requesting the inspection.14  In other states the
provisions authorizing the stockholders to inspect the books have
been held to confer an absolute right of inspection but the enforce-
ment of the right, usually by mandamus,'5 is within the sound judicial
discretion of the court and the remedy 'by mandamus may be with-
held where the stockholder has a wrongful or a sinister purpose.,6
Ohio is apparently committed to the view that the stockholder may
inspect the books of the corporation but "the privilege must be exer-
cised in good faith and that the stockholder must have intent to
inform himself as a stockholder as to the management and state of
affairs of the company." ' The Ohio Supreme Court has held ".... a
presumption of good faith and honesty of purpose attends a request
by a stockholder for permission to inspect the books of account until
the contrary is made to appear by evidence produced by the officer
or agent of the corporation objecting to the inspection." 18 The Ohio
statute merely changes the burden of proof in regard to the issues
of motive and purpose, shifting it from the stockholder, where it
rested at common law, to the corporation resisting the inspection of
its records.
Denial of this right of inspection to the stockholder, in a proper
case, exposes the corporation to a barrage of remedies including ex-
traordinary legal and equitable writs and actions for damages or
penalties.
135 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (1931) §2215.
1 State of Wisconsin ex rel. B. A. Dempsey v. Werra Aluminum Foundry Co., 173
Wis. 651, 182 N. V. 354 (1921); Annotations in (1899) 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185, (1913)
42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332; Venner v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 246 Ill. 170, 92 N. Z 643,
20 Ann. Cas. 607 (1910).
11 See infra. notes 19 and 20.
16 State of Delaware ex rel. William Thiele v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. 514, 115
At. 773 (1922); ef. State ex rel. O'Hara v. National Biscuit Co., 69 N. J. L. 198, 54
At]. 241 (1903) where the same result is reached on the ground that the statute merely
is declaratory of the common law; 5 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (1931) §2215 Annotations
(1923) 22 A. L. R. 24, (1926) 43 A. L. R. 783, (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1373.
"
7 The American Mortgage Co. v. Rosenbaum, 114 Ohio St. 231, 122 N. E. 122, 12
VA. L. R v. 663 (1926).
1SThe William Coale Development Co. v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St. 582, 170 N. E. 434
(1930).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In the United States it is generally held by the great weight of
authority that mandamus is the preferable remedy to enforce the
stockholder's right.1" This writ is usually directed to the officers of
the corporation having the custody of the books and refusing the
right of inspection. In Ohio mandamus will not lie to enforce a
stockholder's prerogative to inspect the books of a corporation, it
being held that mandatory injunction is the proper remedy.20
An action for damages is generally inadequate as a remedy.
The value of a stockholder's right to inspect the books of a corpora-
tion is only speculative - and, as a general rule, only nominal dam-
ages are recoverable..2 '  The value of the plaintiff's time in attempting
to secure the right of inspection and the sums paid as attorney's fees
are generally not recoverable 23 as actual damages in absence of a
statute providing for such an allowance.24 One court has permitted
an action at law for damages only against the officers of the corpora-
tion who refused to allow the inspection, the corporation not being
rendered liable for damages in absence of a statute permitting such
a recovery.2 " As a practical matter the stockholder generally is not
interested in damages for the deprivation of his right of inspection.
It may be years before the damages are known and even then they
could not be accurately measured.2
To obviate this problem inherent in the matter of obtaining
satisfactory compensation in the form of damages, the legislatures
of many states have enacted statutes imposing penalties against the
5
-'D~nnison v. Needlu, 274 MAass. 416, 174 N. E. 687 (1931); Nolan v. Guardian Coal
and Oil Co., 119 W. Va. 545, 194 S. E. 34 (1937); see Annotations (1923) 22 A. L. R.
24, (1926) 43 A. L. P. 783, (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1373.
Ordinarily a court of equity has no power to grant extraordinary aid as a matter of
primary and independent relief. Unless the stockholder has exhausted his rights and
remedies at law, a bill in equity to enforce the privilege of inspection cannot be main-
tained unless it is ancillary to other equitable relief sought by the stockholder against the
corporation or its officers. (Ohio is contra. See infra note 20.)
"Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189, 56 N. E. 1033, 48 L. R. A.
732 (1966). This holding is, in part, based on provisions of the Ohio statute relative to
mandamus (Ohio G. C. 12283) to the effect that "mandamus is a writ issued in the name
of the state, to an inferior tribunal, a corporation or board, or person commanding the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station." Ohio stands almost alone on the holding that mandatory injunction
for relief in equity is the proper remedy. 13 Am. Jut., "Corporations," §444.
21 Arias v. Usera, 38 F. (2d) 235 (1930).
2 Bourdette v. Sieward, 107 La. 258, 31 So. 630 (1902).
=- Boardman v. Mar-hailtown Grocery Co., 105 Iowa 448, 75 N. W. 343 (1898).
='State ex rel. Charnat v. Siegal, 119 Neb. 374, 229 N. .V. 118 (1930).
Legendre v. New Orleans Brewing Assn., 45 La. Ann. 669, 12 So. 837 (1893).
= Cocklburn v. Union Bank, 13 La. Ann. 2c9, cited in 19 Ann. Cas. 308, 311 (1911).
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corporation or its officers for the wilful or wrongful refusal or denial
of the right to inspect, thereby saving the necessity of proof of
damages and limiting and fixing the liability of the offender .2  These
exactions are justified on the ground that they punish the offending
corporation or officer 28 and compel the performance of the duty.'"
To incur the penalty the corporation or an officer thereof must will-
fully neglect or refuse to accord the shareholder his rights to the
inspection of the common property 80 and no special injury need be
alleged or proved.31  The amounts exacted are severe enough to
secure compliance.
Most of the statutes providing for penalties when the stockholder
is denied access to the records of the corporation are more specific
than the Ohio statute in defining what conduct will bring a corpora-
tion or its officers within its purview and justify the imposition of
the specific penalty.
3 2
Tnder Sec. 8623-63, 33 the corporation is required to keep the
various books and records there enumerated. The second paragraph
of this section provides: "The books of account, lists of share-
holders and their addresses, records of the issuance and transfer of
shares, voting trusts agreements, if any are filed, and the minutes
of meetings of every corporation shall be open to the inspection of
every shareholder at all reasonable times save and except for un-
reasonable or improper purposes." Subsection (a) of Sec. 8623-
1z7 8" specifically penalizes failure or refusal to keep books of account
but the failure or refusal to permit an inspection thereof is not spe-
cifically enjoined.
The plaintiff in the principal case nevertheless contended -5 that
unless the statute could be invoked the corporation could refuse in-
spection with impunity, and that the books and transactions of the
corporation could be concealed from the stockholder. The defendant
27 Lewis v. Brainerd, 53 Vt. 516 (1881); cf. Kelsey v. Pfaudler Process Fermentation
Co., 3 N. Y. S. 723, 51 Hun. 636 (1889) where the court said that damages may also
be recovered when they are the result of a neglect or refusal to permit inspection.
23Brown v. Kilden, 58 Wash. 184, 108 Pac. 452 (1910).
21 Cox v. Paul, 175 N. Y. 328, 67 N. E. 586 (1903).
,0 Ibid.; Lewis v. Brainerd, 53 Vt. 516 (1881), cited supra note 27.
3Williams v. College Corner and Richmond Gravel Road Co., 45 Ind. 170 (1373);
Brown v. Kilden, 58 Wash. 184, 108 Pac. 452 (1910), cited supra note 28.
8 5 FLE'rCHER, CORPORATOrONS (1931) §2257.
23 Supra note 3, for the wording of the section.
34 Supra note 2, for the wording of the section.
85 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee on Motion to Certify in the Supreme Court, pp. 4-5.
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contended :30 "The positive acts required to be done by the cor-
poration under Section 8623-127, G. C., and the failure to do which
are subject to the penalties therein, are those spoken of under (a),
(b), (c) and (d) of the section; that by the rule expressio unhs
est exc usio alterins the requirements of (e) are not included in the
penal clause of the section, because the penal clause is all inclusive
in that section and does not refer to or include any other section of
the act."
Under the Ohio cases the right to inspect the books and records
of the corporation is a property right3" incidental to ownership of
the net assets of the corporation through the medium of shares and
is of considerable value although it cannot be calculated or ascer-
tained in money.3' The privilege of inspection is conferred to con-
serve his right as a stockholder.' Defiance of these mandates and
the violation of the apparent spirit of the statute by the corporation
would frequently find the ordinary stockholder unable to maintain
and finance the litigation necessary to enforce his right unless pro-
tracted delay is made unprofitable to the corporation or its officers.
On the basis of policy, therefore, the interpretation of Sec. 8623-127,
G. C., in the Flowers case is correct.
It is somewhat peculiar that the court instead of merely refuting
the defendant's contention for the application of the maxim expressio
unihs est exclusio alterius did not also discuss the effect of Sec.
8623-1 on the solution of the problem before it. The initial section
of the General Corporation Act defines the term "this act" as used
in See. 8623-127 and elsewhere as including "Sections 8623-1 to
8623-138, inclusive, General Code, and ...shall be known and may
be cited as the General Corporation Act, and as so constituted is
hereinafter referred to as 'this act'."
Although there is no clear cut Ohio decision which so holds, 40
it would appear as a matter of reason and principle that when the
legislature in a particular act defines the terms used and declares
that the terms shall receive a certain construction, the court, if not
SFlowers v. Rotary Printing Co., 65 Ohio App. 543, 545, 19 Ohio Op. 249, 31 N. E.
(2d) 251 (1940), cited sz:pra note 4.
- Riggs v. Whippey Process and Engraving Co., 7 Ohio L. Rep. 446 (1909).
-Whitney v. American Shipbuilding Co., 14 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 12, 23 0. D. 1, 19
O. C. C. (n. s.) 584 (1912).
2 Sc supra, notes S to 32, inclusive.
" See the dissent of Lieghley, J., in Union Fratellanza Oratinese v. Picciano, 18 Ohio
L. Abs. 200 (1935), mnajority opinion reversed in 129 Ohio St. 463, .. N. E. .. (1935).
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bound thereby, should accept the definition of the legislature in ascer-




ALITY OF PROVISION FOR SUIT ONLY AT DIRECTION
OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL
An indictment was found against the defendant, 'based upon the
federal anti-racketeering statute. The defendant challenged both
statute and indictment; the former because it provides that prosecu-
tion under it "shall be commenced only upon the express direction of
the attorney-general of the United States," ' the latter because of its
declaration that "this prosecution has been commenced upon the ex-
press direction of the attorney-general of the United States." The
demurrer was overruled. U, S. v. Bioff et al.2
In challenging the statute itself, defendant relies upon both the
doctrine of procedural due process and that of non-delegability of
legislative power. In adversely disposing of the due process objec-
tion the court reasoned that the attorney-general's power over the suit
is but an adaptation of the prosecuting attorney's historic power,
without leave of court, to arrest prosecution by nolle prose qui.
3 It
might have added that the existence of such accepted power in the
attorney-general in no way resembles those serious interferences with
the conduct of an impartial trial which have been judicially con-
demned in the name of due process.4 The other constitutional con-
tention is more difficult of disposition. If the power of control over
criminal prosecutions under the act involves, not the policy formula-
tion that is the essence of the legislative function but that judgment
as to law enforcement which is intrusted to the executive, the answer
248 Stat. 980, 18 U. S. C. A. Sec. 420 C. (Supp. 1940).
840 F. Supp. 497 (S. D. N. Y. 1941)
a U. S. v. Woody, 2 F. (2d) 262 (D. Mont. 1924).
4 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923), mob domination of trial; Brown v. Miss.,
297 U. S. 278 (1935), conviction upon third-degree evidence; see Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U. S. 103 (1935), indicating a similar result in case of conviction on perjured tes-
timony.
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